This laboratory experiment was designed to disentangle effects of various types of
information stemming from dyadic and network embeddedness. More precisely, this experiment
represents an empirical test in which relative complex arguments to trust, such as learning and control
effects, are compared with other “simpler” heuristics, such as imitation or social comparison.
In this experiment, groups of actors embedded in small networks play a repeated Investment Game (Berg et
al. 1995) and exchange information concerning their own behavior as well as their partner’s behavior
in the game. The manipulation of information exchange resembles the experiment conducted by Güth
et al. (2001): Egos know exactly what happened to other Egos in some conditions and they know only
the choices of the other Egos, but not the related choices of the Alters in other conditions. We also
vary uncertainty in the sense that the choices of Alters are ambiguous for Egos in some conditions.
Two publications based on these data;
o Barrera, Davide (2005). Trust in Embedded Settings. Utrecht University PhD thesis (the data are used in Chapter 3).
o Barrera, Davide and Vincent Buskens (2009). Chapter 2: Third-Party Effects. Pp. 37-72 in Karen S. Cook, Chris Snijders, Vincent Buskens, and Coye Cheshire. eTrust: Forming Relationships in the Online World. New York: Russell Sage.
